Volume 30
Issue 4 The International Law of Natural Resources and the Environment: A Selected
Bibliography
Fall 1990

The Availability of the Affirmative Defenses of Assumption of Risk
and the Sale Defense against Common Law Public Nuisance
Actions: United States v. Hooker Chemicals & (and) Plastics Corp.
Julie Mauer

Recommended Citation
Julie Mauer, The Availability of the Affirmative Defenses of Assumption of Risk and the Sale Defense
against Common Law Public Nuisance Actions: United States v. Hooker Chemicals & (and) Plastics Corp.,
30 Nat. Resources J. 941 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol30/iss4/4

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository.
For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NOTE
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE "SALE
DEFENSE" AGAINST COMMON LAW PUBLIC
NUISANCE ACTIONS: UNITED STATES v. HOOKER
CHEMICALS & PLASTICS CORP.1
INTRODUCTION
Pollution control laws have become increasingly tougher, but the courts
have not let go of old common law approaches for punishing polluters.
The courts are allowing plaintiffs to use common law public nuisance
actions against polluters while at the same time limiting the traditional
affirmative defenses available to defendant polluters.
The common law of public nuisance is an ancient cause of action. A
public nuisance is a low-grade criminal offense involving an interference
with the rights of the community as opposed to an individual. The remedy
for a public nuisance must be pursued by the appropriate state agency.2
Such actions are generally brought against landowners on whose property
a nuisance exists, but, with increasing frequency, these actions are also
being brought against the party responsible for the creation of the nuisance
even if that party is not also the landowner. The recent expansion of the
common law public nuisance concept and concurrent restriction of available affirmative defenses makes this additional cause of action highly
desirable and relatively easy to win for environmental plaintiffs.
FACTUAL HISTORY

The construction of Love Canal began in 1894 as an attempt to connect
the upper and lower portions of the Niagra River. The construction was
halted with only three-quarters of a mile completed.' The site, which was
owned by the Niagra Power and Development Corp (NPDC), remained
intact until the early 1940s when Hooker Electrochemical Company (a
predecessor of Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.) (Hooker) sought to
purchase it for use as a waste disposal site.4 Hooker signed an agreement
with NPDC allowing it to use the site from 1942 until it finalized purchase
of the site in 1947.- Hooker continued to dispose of waste in the Love
Canal until 1953, when it sold the site to the City of Niagra Falls Board
of Education. 6 In the eleven year period, Hooker had disposed of 21,800
tons of liquid and solid chemical waste in the Love Canal site.7 The City
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

722 F.Supp. 960 (WD.N.Y. 1989).
W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts 618 (5th ed., 1984).
722 F.Supp. at 961.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of Niagra Falls also disposed of municipal wastes at the site. Several of
the substances disposed of at this site are designated as hazardous under

the Clean Water Act' and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (CERLCA). 9
Hooker sold the 16 acre site to the Board of Education for only one
dollar. The deed contained a "nonliability clause" which was intended
to put the grantee on notice of the condition of the site and to relieve the
grantor of liability for any future injury caused by the buried wastes."
The Board of Education and the State did some work on the site: they
built a school, installed sanitary sewer lines, and removed some of the
topsoil (which originally had been put there by Hooker to cover the wastes
disposed therein). The State also condemned a small portion of the site
to expand a state highway."
In the 1970s, "[hiazardous substances were . . . detected in the surface
water, groundwater, soil, the basements of homes, sewers, creeks, and

other locations in the area surrounding the Love Canal landfill."" In June
1978, the New York Commissioner of Health ordered the Niagra County
Board of Health to abate the public health nuisance. 3 In August 1978,
the Commissioner declared the site a public health emergency. Five days

later, President Carter declared the site a federal emergency. "'The state
emergency order was kept in full force and effect by an order in February
1979; a second federal emergency order was issued by President Carter
in May 1980.1

On December 20, 1979 the state and federal governments filed this
action in the federal district court to recover costs incurred while pre8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a) and 1321(b)(4).
9. 42 U.S.C. §9601(14)(1988).
10. The nonliability clause stated:
Prior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the grantee herein has been
advised by the grantor that the premises above described have been filled, in whole
or in part, to the present grade level thereof with waste products resulting from the
manufacturing of chemicals by the grantor at its plant in the City of Niagara Falls,
New York, and the grantee assumes all risk and liability incident to the use thereof.
It is, therefore, understood and agreed that, as a part of the consideration for this
conveyance and as a condition thereof, no claim, suit, action or demand of any nature
whatsoever shall ever be made by the grantee, its successors or assigns, against the
grantor, its successors or assigns, for injury to a person or persons, including death
resulting therefrom, or loss of or damage to property caused by, in connection with
or by reason of the presence of said industrial wastes. It is further agreed as a condition
hereof that each subsequent conveyance of the aforesaid lands shall be made subject
to the foregoing provisions and conditions. United States v. Hooker Chemicals &
Plastics Corp., 722 F.Supp. 960, 962 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
II. The condemned portion was approximately 2% of the total 16-acre site. 722 F.Supp. at 970.
12. United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F.Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
13. 722 F.Supp. at 962.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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venting further migration of wastes, relocating families and other actions
taken in response to the emergency orders. In February 1988, the court
granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to Hooker's
liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA. 6 The instant motion, made
by the State of New York, is for partial summary judgment as to Hooker's
liability under the common law of public nuisance and for recovery of
costs incurred during clean up of the site. As a matter of law, the court
dismissed Hooker's affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and the
"sale defense" as they relate to Hooker's nuisance liability, but stated
that the assumption of risk defense may be used to mitigate damages.' 7
The court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding Hooker liable as a matter of law under the New York common law
of public nuisance." This note will analyze the affirmative defenses of
assumption of risk and the "sale defense" in light of the common law of
public nuisance.
BACKGROUND
I. Public Nuisance Liability
Before considering affirmative defenses, a court must first determine
if public nuisance liability exists. Public nuisance
is an offense against the State and is subject to abatement or prosecution on application of the proper governmental agency...
[and] . ..consists of conduct or omissions which offend, interfere
with or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights common
to all ...

in a manner such as to ... interfere with use by the

public of a public place or endanger or injure the property, health,
safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons. 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in State of New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.'° applied this theory of public nuisance liability "irrespective
of negligence or fault."2" Shore Realty involved the acquisition of a
hazardous waste dump site for condominium development. 2 Prior to
purchasing the site, Shore Realty hired an environmental consultant to
prepare a detailed report on the condition of the site.23 The report revealed
that many hazardous substances were stored at the site in unsafe containers
16. 680 F.Supp. at546.
17. 722 F.Supp. at 971. CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657(1988).
18. Id.
19. Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968,

971, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (1977).
20. 759 F2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 1051.
22. Id. at 1038.
23. Id.
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and dilapidated facilities. The report also indicated that there had been
spills in the past and that there was groundwater contamination due to
persistent seepage of toxic substances buried there.24 The report concluded
that the site was a "potential time bomb" and recommended that the
current tenants halt their operation. 25 Prior to purchasing the site, Shore
Realty also applied to the State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for a waiver of liability as landowners. The DEC denied
the waiver.26 Nevertheless, Shore Realty took possession of the site without receiving a waiver of liability and after the tenants left without doing

any clean up.27 The State of New York brought suit against Shore Realty

in federal district court under the CERCLA2" and under New York public
nuisance law. Under New York law, a landowner is liable for a public
nuisance on its property after discovering the nuisance and having a

reasonable opportunity to abate it. 9 The court therefore found Shore

Realty liable, stating that "[w~e have no doubt that the release or threat
of release of hazardous waste into the environment unreasonably infringes
upon a public right and thus is a public nuisance as a matter of New York
law."'
Strict liability will apply to a public nuisance created by abnormally
dangerous activities. New York courts since Doundiulakis v. Town of
Hempstead3 have applied the Restatement (2d) Torts section 520 guidelines when determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous." 32
In Doundoulakis, private landowners filed a negligence action against the
town for property damage resulting from a hydraulic landfilling project.33
The principal issue was whether hydraulic dredging and landfilling con24. Id.
25. Id. at 1039.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657.
29. 759 F.2d at 1050. See also, Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (1940); Conhocton
Stone Road v. Buffalo, New York & Erie Railroad Co., 51 N.Y. 573 (1873); New York Telephone
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 99 A.D.2d 185, 473 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1984).
30. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985). See also.
State of New York v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 117 Misc.2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup Ct.
1983) (Schenectady i), affdas modified, 103 A.D.2d 33,479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 3rd Dept.
1984) (Schenectady 11); State of New York v. Monarch Chemicals, 90 A.D.2d 907, 456 N.Y.S.2d
867 (App. Div. 3rd Dept. 1982).
31. 42 N.Y.2d 440, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401, 368 N.E.2d 24 (1977).
32. The Restatement 2d Torts, § 520 (1976) guidelines are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b)
likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e)
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value
to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Id.
33. Hydraulic dredging and landfilling involves "the introduction by pressure of a continuous
flood of massive quantities of sand and water" in order to raise the level of the land. 42 N.Y.2d at
444, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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stitutes an abnormally dangerous activity for which the defendants could
be held strictly liable. While an insufficient record prevented the court
from making a determination as to whether the challenged activity was
abnormally dangerous, the court did suggest that strict liability would be
appropriate.' In ordering a new trial, the Court of Appeals held that the
Restatement criteria should be considered in addition to the plaintiffs'
original negligence action.35
Strict liability may be imposed when the conduct creating the nuisance
occurred many years prior to the manifestation of any harm. The creator
does not also have to be the landowner in order to apply strict liability
for the public nuisance. In State of New York v. Schenectady Chemicals,
Inc., 6 an action was brought by the State to force the chemical company
to pay for clean up of a hazardous waste dump site where that company's
wastes had been disposed of by an independent contractor. Although
disposal had occurred fifteen to twenty years prior to institution of the
action, the court found that there was a right to maintain a public nuisance
action as long as the nuisance persisted.37 The court also found it irrelevant
that Schenectady Chemicals did not own the dump site at any time because
"everyone who creates a nuisance or participates in the creation or maintenance . . of a nuisance are liable jointly and severally for the wrong
and injury done thereby." 3" Thus, the creation of the hazardous waste
alone, without any act in the disposal of such wastes, was at least contributing to the creation of a nuisance for which the creator could be held
liable.
II. The "Sale Defense"
The Restatement (2d) of Torts section 840A states that a vendor is
liable for any nuisance condition upon the land which he sells (subsection
(1)), but that his liability continues only until such time as the vendee
has knowledge of the condition and has had a reasonable time to abate
it (subsection (2))."9 This is the so-called "sale defense." New York courts
34. 42 N.Y.2d at 448, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
35. Id. at 448-449, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404-405.
36. 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup.Ct. 1983) (Schenectady I), aff'd as modified, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010
(3rd Dept. 1984) (Schenectady H).
37. Id. at 977.

38. Id. at 976.
39. Restatement 2d of Torts § 840A provides:
(1) A vendor or lessor of land upon which there is a condition involving a nuisance for which
he would be subject to liability if he continued in possession remains subject to liability for the
continuance of the nuisance after he transfers the land.
(2) If the vendor or lessor has created the condition or has actively concealed it from the vendee
or lessee the liability stated in Subsection (I) continues until the vendee or lessee discovers the
condition and has reasonable opportunity to abate it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the
vendee or lessee has had the reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and abate it. Id.
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historically have followed the approach of both subsections of the Restatement, but no New York court has specifically adopted the defense
as contained in section 840A(2). In Pharm v. Lituchy,4 a 1940 case, the
court held that an owner's liability for a nuisance persisted beyond conveyance only until such time that the new owner had a reasonable 'opportunity to inspect the property, discover the condition, and take the
necessary steps to remedy the situation." The court did not mention the
Restatement at all, but the language used is very similar to that found in
section 840A(2).
While New York courts have not directly addressed section 840A(2),
two New Jersey cases have specifically addressed this subsection and
have adopted it as consistent with New Jersey law. In a 1959 case,
Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc.,42 plaintiffs leased a portion of a
house containing a hazardous stairway. The plaintiffs knew of the faulty
construction more than two years before the injury was sustained from a
fall on the steps. In Sarnicandro, the New Jersey court stated as the
general rule of vendor liability that "once the vendee has taken possession,
the vendor of real estate is not subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to the vendee or others while upon the premises by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time the vendee
took possession." 4' 3 Although the court recognized that there were exceptions to this general rule which extended a vendor's liability for some
period beyond conveyance,' it found that under section 840A(2) of the
Restatement, such an extension was inappropriate in this case because
the vendees had actual knowledge of the nuisance condition and had
ample time in which to repair it."' Thus, the "sale defense" relieved the
vendor of liability for the plaintiff's injuries because the conditions of
section 840A(2) were fulfilled.
Cavanaugh v. Pappas,' a 1966 New Jersey case, involved injuries
sustained when a mother carrying her infant son fell while walking on a
sidewalk that was in disrepair. The property, of which the sidewalk passed
in front, had been sold five days before the accident. The issue was
whether the prior owner or the present owner of the property was liable
for the plaintiff's injuries. The vendor had completely divested himself
40. 283 N.Y. 130 (1940).
41. Id. at
42. 55 N.J.Super. 475, 151 A.2d 48 (1959).
43. Id. at 477, 151 A.2d at 50.
44. Some exceptions include "where the vendor creates a situation which interferes with the
rights of the public or with the use or enjoyment of adjoining lands. In cases where the land is
transferred in such a condition that it invokes an unreasonable risk of harm to those outside the
premises, the vendor has been held liable on the theory of a public or a private nuisance, at least
for a reasonable length of time after he has parted with possession." Id. at 478, 151 A.2d at 51.
45. Id. at 479, 151 A.2d at 52.
46. 91 NJ.Super. 597, 222 A.2d 34 (1966).
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of all interest in the property upon conveyance of the deed.47 The court
found that landowner liability ordinarily terminated upon conveyance of
the property, but, citing Sarnicandro,also found that there are exceptions
to this rule.4 In holding that the vendor was liable to the plaintiffs, the
court relied directly on section 840A(2), 9 concluding that "one should
not be allowed to create a dangerous condition on property which could
cause damage to others and then escape liability for such damages simply
because he sells the property on which the dangerous condition exists."'
The court found that a vendor's liability for nuisance conditions extended
for a reasonable time beyond conveyance, and determined that five days
was not sufficient time for the vendee to abate the nuisance as required
by section 840A(2). Therefore, the "sale defense" did not relieve the
vendor of his liability for the plaintiff's injuries.
Although no New York court has specifically addressed section 840A,
the court in State of New York v. Ole Olsen, Ltd." may have implicitly
rejected this so-called "sale defense." Ole Olsen involved the installation
of faulty sewage systems in recreation homes surrounding a lake. The
faulty systems caused serious degradation of and irreparable damage to
the lake, but the condition did not manifest itself until after the sale of
the homes to private parties. The defendants claimed that their sale of
the properties with the faulty sewage systems relieved them of any liability
for the resulting nuisance and, therefore, the suit against them should be
dismissed. The defendants did not claim, however, that the vendees knew
of the nuisance and had had a reasonable opportunity to abate it as required
by section 840A(2). In concluding that the plaintiffs did have a cause of
action against the developers, the court found that "[aImple authority
exists to the effect that the creator of a nuisance does not, by conveying
his property to another, release himself from liability for its continuance."' 2 Thus, it appears that, without specific mention of the Restatement, the New York courts have rejected the "sale defense" of section
840A(2) at least as it applies to public nuisances.
III. The Assumption of Risk Defense
At common law, the affirmative defense of assumption of risk was
traditionally available to defendants.
In its most basic sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff,
47. Id. at 599, 222 A.2d at 36.
48. Id. at 600, 222 A.2d at 37.
49. Id. at 601, 222 A.2d at 38.
50. Id.
51. State of New York v. Ole Olsen, 317 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup.Ct. 1971), aff'd, 331 N.Y.S,2d
761 (2nd Dept. 1972), affd mem., 357 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1974), aff'd as modified, 365 N.Y.S.2d
528 (1975).
52. Id. at 541, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
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in advance, has given his express consent to relieve the defendant
of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of
injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do
or leave undone.5 3
In cases where the plaintiff was found to have assumed the risk, the
defendant was not liable for any injuries or damages caused by his conduct. This was so even in cases of strict liability. Then, in 1975, the New
York legislature enacted Article 14-A of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
(C.P.L.R.) which provided that assumption of risk would no longer act
as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery, but would instead diminish the
amount of damages recoverable based upon a comparison of the culpable
conduct of the parties.' This article is applicable to all negligence actions
and also to any other action seeking to recover damages for personal
injury or property damage. 5
A leading New York case interpreting and applying C.P.L.R. Article
14-A-specifically, sections 1411 and 1412-is Arbegast v. Board of
Education.6 The plaintiff in Arbegast was a high school teacher participating in a school-sponsored donkey basketball game. Prior to the second
game she was warned by an employee of the donkey owner that the
donkey she was about to mount was known to stop suddenly, thereby
unseating its rider. With this knowledge, the plaintiff continued to participate in the games on the unpredictable donkey until she was thrown,
as warned, and was injured. She brought suit against the school and the
owners of the donkeys. The school reached a settlement with her, but
the owners claimed that they were not liable because she had been forewarned, and therefore, had participated in the games at her own risk.
Because there was evidence that the plaintiff had expressly assumed the
risk of injury, the court had to determine how C.P.L.R. 1411 and 1412
applied. The court, relying on the legislative history of Article 14-A,
determined that the article was applicable "to all actions brought to
recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death
whatever the legal theory upon which the suit is based," and that the
defendant's culpable conduct does not necessarily have to be negligent
53. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, supra note 2, at 480.
54. C.P.L.R.. art. 14-A, § 1411 (1975) provides that in any action to recover damages for personal
injury, injury to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to
the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery. However, the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the
culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused
the damages. Id.
C.P.L.R., art. 14-A, § 1412 provides that the culpable conduct claimed in diminution of damages,
in accordance with CPLR 1411, shall be an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the
party asserting the defense. Id.
55. Arbegast v. Board of Education, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751, 755 (1985).
56. Id. at 751.
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and may even be conduct ordinarily resulting in strict liability." Essentially, the court determined that C.P.L.R. Article 14-A had a very broad
application covering the range of suits brought to recover damages for
some act or injury.
The legislative history of C.P.L.R. Article 14-A did not, however,
define "assumption of risk." The court, therefore, relied on the common
law distinctions between implied assumption of risk and express assumption of risk. 8 Express assumption of risk was an absolute bar to
recovery and "resulted from agreement in advance that defendant need
not use reasonable care for the benefit of plaintiff" whereas implied
assumption of risk was based on "plaintiff's voluntarily encountering the
risk of harm from defendant's conduct with full understanding of the
possible harm" and was not always an absolute bar to recovery. 9 The
court found that section 1411 did not change the existing law as to express
assumption of risk, but did act to diminish damages in cases of implied
assumption of risk.' Specifically, the court held that "CPLR 1411 requires
diminishment of damages in the case of an implied assumption of risk
but, except as public policy proscribes an agreement limiting liability,
does not foreclose a complete defense that by express consent of the
injured party no duty exists and, therefore, no recovery may be had." 6
The court in Arbegast granted the defendant's motion for a directed
'verdict based on the plaintiff's testimony that, prior to participating in
the game, she had been advised by a representative of the owner that the
donkey had a tendency to stop suddenly, often resulting in unseating of
the rider.62 The court found no public policy reasons for nullifying the
plaintiff's agreement. The plaintiff's express assumption of risk therefore
acted as an absolute bar to recovery from the defendants.
The court in Arbegast held that public policy considerations might bar
the use of express assumption of risk as a complete defense from liability,
but the court did not elaborate on this exception. Three New York cases
have provided limited examples, all relating to a State's exercise of its
sovereign powers.62 One exception, based on the theory of eminent domain, provides that the state may take "title to land free of all encumbrances and inconsistent proprietary rights."63 A second exception is that
the State will not be completely barred from recovery of costs incurred
57. Id. at 755-56.
58. Id. at 757.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 757-758.
62. Id. at 758.
63. United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 722 F.Supp. 960, 971 (N.D.N.Y. 1989),
citing Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v. Lord, 39 N.Y.2d 628, 385 N.Y.S.2d 28, 350 N.E.2d
405 (1976).
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in the exercise of its "police powers to protect the public health."' The
third exception is that New York courts will generally show due deference
to the state's exercise of its sovereign powers.65 All these exceptions relate
to State actions; further exceptions have yet to be developed.
ANALYSIS
I. Public Nuisance Liability
In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,' the State of
New York contended that it was exercising its police powers, first in
abating the existing public nuisance and later in seeking reimbursement
for those costs from the responsible party.67 According to the State, Hooker,
as the responsible party, was jointly and severally liable without regard
to negligence or fault under New York common law for the public nuisance
condition at the Love Canal site.6" The State argued further that ordinary
negligence standards such as proximate cause and foreseeability were
inapplicable to public nuisance actions brought under the police powers
of a sovereign. 69 The State wanted a "more expansive view of causation"
to be applied to cases such as this, so that the creator of the condition
would be liable for the resulting nuisance.7' The State argued in the
alternative that there was sufficient factual evidence in the record, such
as the nonliability clause in the conveyance deed, to find that Hooker
was aware of the hazardous condition and the possibility of resulting
harm. 7 ' Therefore, the State argued, Hooker Chemicals & Plastics was
liable under New York common law for the costs incurred by the State
in abating the public nuisance at the Love Canal waste disposal site and
a partial summary judgment as to Hooker's liability was appropriate."
Hooker, on the other hand, contended that "the disposal of chemical
waste is not per se abnormally dangerous activity" and, therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.73 Also inappropriate for summary
judgment, according to Hooker, was an analysis of the Doundoulakis
guidelines for determining abnormally dangerous activities.74 Hooker argued that general negligence principles such as proximate cause and
foreseeability had to be applied in determining its liability. Hooker also
attempted to distinguish "creators" from "maintainers" of nuisance con64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id., citing Carillo v. Axelrod, 88 A.D.2d 681, 450 N.Y.S.2d 909 (3rd Dept. 1982),
Id., citing Kohl Industrial Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1983).
722 FSupp. 960 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 962.
Id. at 962-63.
ld. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74. Id. at 966.
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ditions, arguing that proximate cause is not necessary to establish liability
of the latter group, but is necessary for the former group." Referring to
its "safe, state-of-the-art disposal of wastes," Hooker argued that there
was no causal link to establish its liability for the public nuisance.76
Because the State had not established liability according to general negligence principles or a causal link between Hooker's conduct and the
public nuisance, Hooker contended that summary judgment as to its
liability was inappropriate. 77
The court found it relatively easy to establish Hooker's liability under
common law of public nuisance for the condition existing at the Love
Canal waste site. It was undisputed that Hooker had created and disposed
of tons of chemical wastes in the Love Canal site, that these wastes had
combined with water to form a leachate, and that this leachate had exited
the Love Canal site and caused the contamination of the surrounding
area. 8 The contamination posed a serious health threat as evidenced by
the several health advisories issued by both state and federal governments
and the federal declaration that a state of emergency existed.79 The undisputed facts indicated that Hooker was liable for the public nuisance,
but the court also held that, at least in cases such as this, the disposal of
hazardous wastes constituted an abnormally dangerous activity.8 The
court admitted that no New York court had yet reached such a conclusion,
but concluded that the leading cases indicated that such a holding would
be reasonable given the appropriate, undisputed facts." In aid of this
position is the fact that Hooker had been found strictly liable under section
107(a) of CERCLA."2 The court had previously determined Hooker's
responsibility for the creation of the condition and, therefore, had only
to fit those findings into the New York common law of public nuisance.
The court, therefore, determined that the undisputed facts indicated Hooker's responsibility for the condition created and that Hooker's disposal
of hazardous wastes constituted an abnormally dangerous activity under
New York law and required the application of strict liability. 3
II. The Sale Defense
Hooker argued that, because New York courts had adopted the "sale
defense" as stated in section 840A(2) of the Restatement (2d) of Torts,
75.
76,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 963-64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 966-67.
Id.
680 F.Supp. at 556-59.
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its liability for any harm was terminated when it conveyed the property
to the Board of Education with the nonliability clause included in the
deed." Relying primarily on Ole Olsen, the State argued that New York
courts have rejected the "sale defense," at least with respect to cases
involving
the State's exercise of its police powers to abate public nuis85
ances.
The court, like the State, relied primarily on Ole Olsen in discarding
Hooker's sale defense. The court found that Ole Olsen implicitly rejected
the application of the "sale defense" because several courts had reviewed
the case and none of them considered subsection (2).6 The weakness of
this argument is obvious: the court may not have considered section 840A
simply because it found it inapplicable. With regard to Hooker Chemical
and the Love Canal site, the court held that "the different interests protected by the doctrines of public and private nuisance, as well as the
nature of the activity involved, require the application of an exception to
the limitation of a vendor's liability found in the Restatement. "87
Essentially, the court found it inappropriate to relieve the creator of a
public nuisance to escape liability simply by selling the property and
making the buyer aware of the condition. This is especially true where
hazardous wastes are concerned. The court relied on the distinction "between mere negligent maintenance of the property and affirmative acts
of negligence in the actual creation of a nuisance or dangerous condition." 8" Because Hooker had taken affirmative actions which resulted in
the creation of the nuisance condition, ownership of the property was
immaterial and Hooker's sale of the property, even with the nonliability
clause, was irrelevant to its liability for the public nuisance.8
II1.

Assumption of Risk
Hooker claims that the Board of Education expressly assumed the risk
of injury when it signed the purchase agreement containing the nonliability
clause and, therefore, Hooker cannot be held liable for the resulting
nuisance.' According to Hooker, this express assumption of risk also
applied to the State when it condemned a portion of the Love Canal site.
The court begrudgingly agreed that, at least arguably, the State had expressly assumed the risk of injury.9' However, the court, relying primarily
on Arbegast, concluded that a public policy exception to C.P.L.R. Article
84. Id. at 968.
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14-A and express assumption of risk should apply.92 The court found that
the theory of eminent domain and a State's right to take land for public
purposes without encumberances or other inconsistent proprietary rights9"
provided the necessary exception. The court, therefore, rejected Hooker's
assumption of risk defense as it applied to liability, but held that the
defense might help mitigate damages.'
One very obvious fault with this holding is that the State had condemned
only a small portion of the land, but the court seemingly rejected the
defense as to liability for the entire Love Canal site. The court does not
even discuss the remainder of the Love Canal site, which was owned by
the Board of Education and private parties, and how assumption of risk
might relieve Hooker of liability, nor does it discuss what policy exceptions might apply, as in the case of state-owned land. This may be the
weakest point in the court's opinion, particularly because this was a partial
summary judgment rather than a decision rendered at the conclusion of
a trial.
CONCLUSION
At a time when there is an ever-increasing amount of environmental
legislation enabling parties to bring actions against polluters, environmental plaintiffs are still using common law approaches such as public
nuisance. More significantly, courts appear to be sympathetic to these
approaches, but not to the traditional common law affirmative defenses,
such as the sale defense and assumption of risk. Today's judiciary appears
to be more environmentally conscious when ruling in such cases, and
therefore, is using public policy exceptions to lessen the harsh consequences of out-dated common law defenses. This could be a very important step in the effort to clean up the environment as well as letting
those destroying it know that they will have to pay.
JULIE MAUER
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